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Abstract In biomedical research lack of trust is seen as a
great threat that can severely jeopardise the whole
biomedical research enterprise. Practices, such as informed
consent, and also the administrative and regulatory over-
sight of research in the form of research ethics committees
and Institutional Review Boards, are established to ensure
the protection of future research subjects and, at the same
time, restore public trust in biomedical research. Empirical
research also testifies to the role of trust as one of the
decisive factors in research participation and lack of trust
as a barrier for consenting to research. However, what is
often missing is a clear definition of trust. This paper seeks
to address this gap. It starts with a conceptual analysis of
the term trust. It compares trust with two other related
terms, those of reliance and trustworthiness, and offers a
defence of Baier’s attribute of ‘good will’ a basic charac-
teristic of trust. It, then, proceeds to consider trust in the
context of biomedical research by examining two ques-
tions: First, is trust necessary in biomedical research?; and
second, do increases in regulatory oversight of biomedical
research also increase trust in the field? This paper argues
that regulatory oversight is important for increasing reli-
ance in biomedical research, but it does not improve trust,
which remains important for biomedical research. It fin-
ishes by pointing at professional integrity as a way of
promoting trust and trustworthiness in this field.
Keywords Trust  Reliance  Trustworthiness  Biomedical
research  Research ethics  Professional integrity
Introduction
In biomedical research lack of trust is seen as a great threat
that can severely jeopardise the whole biomedical research
enterprise (Kass et al. 1996; Mastroianni 2008). Practices
such as informed consent and also the introduction of
administrative and regulatory oversight of research in the
form of research ethics committees (RECs) and Institu-
tional Review Boards (IRBs), are to ensure the protection
of future research subjects and, at the same time, restore
public trust in biomedical research (Pettit 1992; Bok 1995;
Yarborough and Sharp 2002; Faden et al. 2005; Dixon-
Woods and Ashcroft 2008). Empirical research also testi-
fies to the role of trust as one of the decisive factors in
research participation and lack of trust as a barrier for
consenting to research (Sugarman et al. 1998; Corbie-
Smith et al. 1999; de Melo-Martı´n and Ho 2008; Marsh
et al. 2008; Slegers et al. 2015).
O’Neill, on the other hand,maintains that reports of loss of
trust might be misleading, as they do not reflect the way
people actually behave (O’Neill 2002a, b). If people really
distrusted biomedical research, she argues, then a decrease in
biomedical research involving humans should be the out-
come of this, rather than the increase that is observed
(O’Neill 2002a, b). This seems to imply that trust is rather
unimportant, or at least not as important in biomedical
research as is usually led to be believed. If this is true,
researchers could stop worrying about building trust rela-
tionships with their research participants and participating
communities, and just get on with their research. As long as
they follow the appropriate rules and regulations, whether
they are trusted by their participants and participating com-
munities or not, should not have an effect on their research.
Some might recoil at the idea that building trust rela-
tionships should be scrapped from the ‘ethical’
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requirements of research. For example, community
engagement has been promoted as the most effective way
of building trust relationships with participants and com-
munities, and for this reason, is increasingly seen as
essential requirement of ethical research (Marshall and
Rotimi 2001). Equally, the requirement for consent has
also been defended as a method for trust building (Faden
et al. 2005). What is often missing from such accounts,
however, is a clear definition of trust. Trust, like dignity
and respect, has become yet another nebulous term in
research ethics which is often invoked but rarely examined
in this context.
This paper is coming to address this gap. It starts with a
conceptual analysis of the term trust. It compares trust with
two other related terms, these of reliance and trustworthi-
ness, and offers a defence of Baier’s attribute of ‘good will’
as a basic characteristic of trust. It then, proceeds to con-
sider trust in the context of biomedical research by exam-
ining two questions: First, is trust necessary in biomedical
research?; and second, do increases in regulatory oversight
of biomedical research also increase trust in the field? It
argues that regulatory oversight is important for increasing
reliance in biomedical research, but it does not improve
trust. The paper argues that trust is, however, important for
biomedical research, and it finishes by pointing at profes-
sional integrity as a way of promoting trust and trustwor-
thiness in this field.
Trust, reliance and trustworthiness
Trust can take different forms depending on the person on
whom we declare our trust, and also on the situation. There
are people that we trust wholeheartedly and perfectly, for
example our mother or spouse, and others that we trust with
something specific or only in a particular situation, for
example our business-partner with the running of our
company (but not with looking after our children). Trust
developed between two individuals is called personal trust,
whereas trust directed to institutions, professional bodies,
companies, governments or other large social systems is
referred to as institutional, a personal or impersonal trust.
Some question institutional or apersonal trust arguing that
trust is a relationship developed overtime between two
individual agents (Mayer et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998).
It could be argued, however, that in so far as institutions,
companies and other large social systems can make deci-
sions and act as one body, they have a unique moral
character—which is different from and cannot be reduced
to the character of its members—and therefore can be
judged and trusted as distinct moral agents. In this paper,
the nouns trustors and trustees would refer to both indi-
viduals and institutions, unless differently specified.
Irrespective of the different forms trust can take, all such
relationships share some common characteristics: (1)
assumption of ‘participant stance’ or vulnerability; (2)
attitude of ‘good will’ towards the trustor; and (3) volun-
tariness. Assuming a ‘participant stance’ (Holton 1994;
Wright 2010), means that the trustor enters a relationship
where she believes that the trustee can decisively influence
the outcome of the entrusted action (Wright 2010, 618f). In
other words, the trustor knowingly makes herself vulnera-
ble towards the trustee. The adoption of this stance is what
justifies feelings of gratitude, when trust is confirmed, or
betrayal, when trust is disproved. I trust my friend not to
reveal a very important secret that I entrusted in her. If she
honours my trust and keeps my secret, I do not only feel
assured but also grateful for her behaviour. If she does,
however, reveal my secret to a third party, then I feel not
only upset about it, but also betrayed by her. As both
Holton (1994) and Wright (2010) point out, these feelings
of betrayal or gratitude are appropriate because we trust
our friends, we do not simply rely on them.
In order for beliefs of betrayal or gratitude to be jus-
tified, and for the belief that the trustee can influence the
outcome of the action to be reasonable, the trustee has to
be aware that trust has been placed on them. Their
awareness of entrustment adds another component in their
decision making. If one knows that their friend trusts
them with certain information, this knowledge will
influence their behaviour and decision making. To return
to the earlier example, the friend will not only need to
consider whether the information she has should be
revealed or not, but also the effect her decision will have
upon her friend, the trustor. This leads us to the second
characteristic of trust relationship, which is the assump-
tion or belief that the trustee has ‘good will’ towards the
trustor (Baier 1986). Holton and Wright object to the role
of good will as a necessary component of a trust rela-
tionship. One can imagine a trust case where good will is
not required, they maintain, for example when an army
decides to raise the white flag and trusts that their
adversaries will not kill them (Holton 1994; Wright
2010). O’Neill also rejects the necessity of feelings of
good will in trust relationships. We all take medication,
she argues, that has been developed by pharmaceutical
companies for which we have no reason to assume they
have good will towards us (O’Neill 2002a, b). A respond
to this criticism lies in the distinction between trusting
behaviours—acting like we trust- and trusting attitude—
actually trusting (Hall et al. 2001). An army surrendering
to their opponent when there is no other option available,
other than certain death, can hardly be described as an act
of trust.
Entering a relationship, in which we assume a partici-
pant stance, out of mere necessity rather than choice cannot
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be described as trust relationship.1 Voluntariness, there-
fore, is the third characteristic of trust relationships. Trust
cannot be demanded and it is only freely given. If no
options are available or one is presented with an ‘empty
choice’ (Kingori 2015), then the action is not motivated by
trust. Similarly, continuing to use medicines produced by
pharmaceutical companies does not necessarily denote a
relationship of trust. People expect that pharmaceutical
companies will not poison or harm them with their prod-
ucts, not (necessarily) because they feel that the pharma-
ceutical industry has good will towards them, but because
they (also) believe that the system that regulates the
pharmaceutical industry is been developed within a
framework that seeks and supports the welfare of the
people, and therefore has good will towards society. So,
what appears as an act of trust towards the pharmaceutical
industry is actually an act of trust towards the overarching
system that wills our good. What these characteristics of
trust -vulnerability, voluntariness and assumption of good
will-reveal is the moral component and underpinnings of
trust. We can say that we trust someone when we know that
his actions could make us happy (feelings of gratitude) or
hurt us (feelings of betrayal),2 and we expect that our
vulnerability towards them would be taken into account
‘directly and favourably’ (Jones 1996) when they consider
how to act. We do not trust mere agents, but rather we trust
moral agents. We expect those whom we trust to behave
not just as we assume they will, but as we believe they
should or ought to (Walker 2006; Jones 2012).
Reliance, being able to rely on someone to act in a
particular way, is often used as a synonym to trust. How-
ever, there is a clear distinction between these two terms.
Reliance does not justify feelings of gratitude or betrayal,
nor does it necessitate ‘good will’ between the partners
(Jones 1996). This means that although we can be harmed
or wronged by an individual or an institution on whom we
relied but they failed us, we cannot be hurt by them –at
least not in the same way that breaking trust hurts. We rely
on the supply of gas to our house to use the gas cooker, but
we do not assume malevolent intentions to our gas supplier,
if the supply gets interrupted whilst we are cooking our
dinner. When we deposit a check into our account we rely
on the bank clerk in our local branch to process the pay-
ment. If he fails to do so and our money goes missing we
will feel annoyed, upset, even angry and will use all legal
routes available to retrieve our money, but we will not feel
betrayed by him; at least not as one would, if we were to
find out that our best friend had been stealing money from
us. Reliance is an act of dependence based on the likely
prediction of the other’s behaviour. It does require or entail
the assumption of good will, nor the expectation that our
vulnerability will be considered directly and favourably
(Baier 1986; Jones 1996).
Another concept that requires some clarification in
relation to trust is that of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness
relates to the person who is being trusted. It refers to the
exhibit of characteristics of the trustee, which indicate
that the trustee has good will towards the trustor. A
person can be characterised as trustworthy when she
‘acknowledges the value of the trust that is invested in
[her, and] uses that to help [her] rationally decide how to
act’(Wright 2010, 622). As O’Neill points out, building
and restoring trust relationships, in effect means building
or restoring individuals’ and institutions’ trustworthiness.
Given that trust is something that is voluntary given and
cannot be demanded, the only way of restoring trust is by
enhancing trustworthiness and thus, creating the condi-
tions for trust relationships to ensue and flourish (O’Neill
2002a, b).
Trust in the context of biomedical research
A trust relationship in biomedical research can take any of
the aforementioned forms. It can be a case of personal trust
between two individuals (e.g. a researcher and research
participants) or it can be a case of apersonal trust between
an individual and an institution (e.g. research participant
and research institutions) or between two institutions (e.g.
two collaborating research institutions).
1 An exception to this rule would be the infant-mother relationship,
where the newborn baby seems to ‘trust’ the mother to care for it and
not poison it with her milk. Two things can be said as a response to
this counterargument. Firstly, I believe that the infant-mother case
says more about the importance of good will in trust relationships
rather than the role of necessity. It is safe to assume an innate urge to
turn to the being that gave birth to us for safety and nutrition. It is
when this basic urge is not fulfilled, when we realise that the person in
question does not have our good will at heart that feelings of distrust
emerge. Secondly, I would draw a distinction between a trust
relationship and the appearance of a trust relationship to an external
observer. Relationships of necessity might have the appearance of a
trust relationship to an external observer who cannot test or verify the
trustor’s voluntariness and belief in the trustee’s good will. Yet the
mere appearance of something as y does not justify it actually being
y. For an interesting analysis of the mother-infant relationships see:
Baier (1986).
2 When someone decides to betray our trust, this does not necessarily
mean that s/he wills our ill too. Consider this example: Person A is
diabetic and is at the hospital for dialysis. Person B visits person A.
Person A reveals to person B that he has a stack of sweets and
chocolates under his pillow, but vows person B not to say anything to
his doctors because they will take the sweets away from him. Person
B being aware of the seriousness of person’s A health condition
decided to break his friend’s trust and tell his doctors about the hidden
sweets. One can contest whether person B promising not to tell the
doctors’ about person’s A sweets was the right thing to do, but still
one can accept that person B reveals the secret out of good will
towards his friend.
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The long list of scandals in biomedical research, from the
Nazi doctors’ experiments to the more recent cases of Jesse
Gellsinger (Stolberg 1999), the SUPPORT neonatal trial
(Lantos 2014) and the Macchiarini case (KI 2016), it has
been argued, has undermined public trust in it. The intro-
duction of laws and rules to regulate biomedical research,
and the promotion of transparency and accountability has
been seen as the appropriate response to the loss of trust and
as a way to reinstate and promote trustworthiness (Bosk
2002). Building on the Nuremberg Code of 1948, the
Declaration of Helsinki first published in 1964 by the World
Medical Association,3 and the Belmont Report in 1979
stipulated the ethical parameters of biomedical research
involving human subjects. Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs) and, Research Ethics Committees (RECs) were
established by research and medical institutions to oversee
biomedical research, and to ensure researchers’ compliance
with research ethics regulations and guidelines, and to
safeguard the participants’ welfare (Ellis 1999; EC 2001,
The medicines for human use (clinical trials) regulations
2004). Consent forms are now obligatory for all biomedical
research that requires the participation of human subjects. It
is increasingly the norm for the transfer of research mate-
rials between researchers and institutions to be regulated by
material transfer agreements (MTAs). Also, all clinical
trials are now registered on an online open access database
(WHO ICTRP). Two questions should be examined in this
context. First, whether increases in regulatory oversight of
biomedical research also increases trust in the field or just
reliance and compliance; and second, whether trust is,
indeed, necessary in biomedical research
Regulatory oversight and trust in biomedical
research
The common response to the loss of trust in a profession or
institution is the introduction of new agreements, the
strengthening of regulations and accountability pathways
(Pettit 1992), and the establishment of ‘guardians of trust’
(Shapiro 1987). In biomedical research this response took
the form of national and international RECs and IRBs,
MTAs, international clinical trial registries and a plethora
of rules of conduct and guidelines for researchers and
institutions. Some authors have suggested that trustwor-
thiness can be increased by such methods, for example by
introducing sanctions, which ensure that the person or
institution on whom trust has been placed will act as
expected (Hardin 1996). Others, on the other hand, argue
that regulations and sanctions do not increase trustworthi-
ness but, rather, compliance and reliance (Wright 2010).
This is because the reason the person has decided to act in a
particular way is self-interest, rather than the desire not to
betray and hurt someone. Mouzas et al., describe reliance
as the rational manifestation of a consent-based exchange
where ‘contracting parties […] bring to the exchange cer-
tain entitlement and they manifest their consent to the
transfer of these entitlements’(Mouzas et al. 2007, 1021).
Methods that increase accountability and compliance can
positively affect relationships of reliance by increasing
commitment and introducing or strengthening self-interest
reasons to behave a certain way. Through this process
relationships between partners are strengthened.
In trust relationships, though, what matters is not only
whether the trustee is motivated to fulfil the entrusted act,
but also the reasons that motivate him or her. Trust is a
relationship where the trustor becomes vulnerable to the
trustee by recognising and accepting the effect the trustee’s
decision would have on the outcome of the entrusted
action, and hopes that the trustee will honour the rela-
tionship and fulfil the entrusted act. The vulnerability of the
trustor and a genuine concern and consideration for him or
her, namely an attitude of good will towards them, are the
motivating factors of a trust relationship. Persons or insti-
tutions that wish to become more trustworthy, as oppose to
only appear to behave more trustworthily, could achieve
this by the adoption of an attitude of good will towards the
trustor; that is by acknowledging the trusting party’s vul-
nerability and taking this into direct and favourable con-
sideration. The difference between reliance and trust lies
on whether the motivational reason behind the action is
good will or self-interest.
Introducing sanctions and placing safeguards to ensure
compliance and increase reliance could be seen as the
opposite of trust, as an action of distrust (O’Neill 2002a, b).
When we ask our friend to pick up the post for us, we do not
feel the need to threaten them with sanctions in case they
fail do to so.4 We trust them that they will not ‘let us down’.
If we were to present them with a contract that said that in
the case they failed to pick up our post, they will incur a
penalty of £20, this would mean that we do not trust them
and we are trying to protect ourselves from being ‘let down’
by attempting to promote their reliability. The introduction
of rules and regulations can be seen as a confirmation of the
untrustworthiness of a party, as it indicates that this party is
not motivated by good will to act trustworthily, and that
their behaviour needs to be guided and controlled by rules,
contracts, regulations and penalties. Shapiro calls this the
3 Since 1964 the Helsinki Declaration has been revised many times,
always trying to safeguard research participants and consequently
increase researchers’ accountability towards participant’s welfare.
The latest revision was in 2013.
4 The loss of trust that could result from being ‘let down’ repeatedly,
and unjustifiably, does not count as a sanction.
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‘paradox of trust’. She observes that ‘[b]y buying or
requiring ‘‘fidelity’’ insurance, we discourage internal dis-
cipline and control and thereby increase the likelihood that
trust will be abused’ (Shapiro 1987). Similarly, Pettit
expressed his reservations and scepticism regarding the
introduction of RECs and IRBs, which, he feared, would
corrupt professional integrity and lead to more unethical
behaviour (Pettit 1992). What Shapiro and Pettit imply is
that there is a reverse relationship between regulations and
trust. Ensuring reliability adversely affects trust and trust-
worthiness. It would seem appropriate to suggest that in
order to promote trust and trustworthiness in biomedical
research, it is necessary to decrease the level of oversight
and withdraw some of the rules and regulations that govern
it.
Is trust necessary in biomedical research?
Before we start dismantling ethics committees and scrap-
ping regulations, however, it is important to consider
whether trust is actually relevant or even necessary in
biomedical research. If one can rely on a researcher or
research institution that they will act as expected, is it also
necessary that one should be able to trust them, as well? If
by revising and strengthening rules and sanctions all par-
ties’ compliance can be ensured, it can only be a good thing
that researchers, participants, research institutions, public
and private do not have to trust each other anymore. For in
order for trust to still be relevant in biomedical research, it
needs to be demonstrated that one of the parties assumes a
participant stance, namely it assumes a vulnerable position
and opens itself up to be validated or betrayed by the other
party.
The relationship between researchers, their institutions
and research participants is often described as a consent-
based relationship, which depends on reasonable expecta-
tions and proven capacity. Strict regulations, greater
transparency, clear system of accountability make the
partners or participants feel that they can rely on the
institution or researcher to do what it has been agreed. If
biomedical research can be described solely as a consent-
based exchange, then, it can be argued, the existence of
trust, or lack thereof, between the stakeholders is irrelevant.
In cases where reliability is low and accountability is
lacking, rules and regulations can be introduced to make
the exchange between the two parties more equal and fair;
reliance can be promoted through structures and guidelines
that increase accountability. What increased reliance can
achieve, is to bring the collaborating parties together as
equals (or near equals) and thus, mitigate power imbal-
ances between them. Once reliance and compliance is
secured, more successful collaboration will ensue, as both
partners, being two institutions, institutions and research
participants, or researcher and participant, will feel confi-
dent and secure in their relationships (Yarborough et al.
2009).
Increasing compliance is undeniably important, but, as
mentioned above, it cannot solve the trust problem in
biomedical research. It is worth probing a bit further the
question of why people still remain sceptical towards
biomedical research even though all aspects of it, from the
recruitment of participants, to sample and data collection,
sharing and use is closely regulated. Do research partici-
pants make themselves vulnerable (i.e. assume a partici-
pant stance) by participating in research, and if yes, how?
All research participation entails some level of risk to
the participant. Consent forms are a necessary requirement,
as they lay down the terms and conditions of the rela-
tionship. They inform prospective participants of the
specific risks, potential benefits (e.g. post-trial access to
medication at an individual or community level), what is
required from participants and what can be expected from
researchers and their institutions, and allow individuals
(and/or communities) to make a free and informed decision
regarding their participation. However, informing potential
participants openly and transparently about the risks of
research does not absolve researchers from the obligation
to take any possible steps to minimize potential risks, to
provide safeguards for the participants’ welfare and to
ensure fair distribution of research benefits. For partici-
pants to actually trust the researchers, it means that they
believe that the researchers have designed and will conduct
the research with an attitude of good will towards them. As
O’Neill observes, the signing of consent forms does not
confirm trust, rather it presupposes it (O’Neill 2002a, b).
Furthermore, by becoming research subjects, all partic-
ipants ‘surrender’ their health and health related informa-
tion (in various degrees, depending on the type of
biomedical research) to the hands of research professionals
and institutions. Drawing a parallel with the doctor-patient
relationship here might be helpful to clarify this point,
although it is important to note that researchers do not have
the same obligations towards the participants, as doctors do
towards their patients (Rhodes 2005). Patients trust doctors
not only because there is a clear legislation and a system of
accountability in place to protect them, but also because
they feel that the doctor has a good will towards them. The
patient invariably assumes a participant stance towards his
or her doctor. This means that the patient accepts that the
doctor’s actions would have a definitive effect on the
outcome of the entrusted action—restoration of health. A
clear and effective system of accountability notwithstand-
ing, the patient is always in a vulnerable position. Com-
petency and concern about patients’ interests suffices to
justify a doctor’s reliability. Trust however, requires that
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the doctor is responsive to the patient’s vulnerability, and
that she or he takes it into account when considering his or
her course of action.
Similarly, in biomedical research participants can risk
their health by participating in drug trials or put themselves
into emotional, social or economic risk by participating in
research that could lead to ethnic or group stigmatization
(de Vries et al. 2012). Again, systems of control and
accountability cannot compensate for putting oneself in a
position of vulnerability. The participants knowingly
assume a participant stance towards the researchers, and
they need to feel that researchers and research institutions
have a good will towards them and towards society as a
whole (Molyneux et al. 2005; Tindana et al. 2011). An
attitude of good will in the research context would mean
that researchers would acknowledge the participants’ vul-
nerability and take it into account when considering how to
design, conduct and implement their research.5
Even in research where participants are healthy volun-
teers and there is minimal physical risk involved, such as in
genomic research, participants also need to assume that the
researchers and institutions which will use and curate their
genetic information have a good will towards them
(Hansson 2005; Tindana et al. 2012).6 Most genetic and
genomic data nowadays are collected under broad consent,
meaning that the participants are not informed about the
particular future uses of their genetic information, or about
who might be given access to them. The participants are
asked to trust ethics committees, researchers, biobanks and
universities that their genetic information will be put to
good use and that, directly or indirectly, their interests and
welfare will be promoted. The rules of this agreement are
open and vague and the participants invariably place
themselves into a position of vulnerability by entering a
relationship where the trustee can decisively influence the
outcome of the entrusted action. Participants have the
option to choose which institution to trust, the same way
that people choose which person to befriend. They can
chose to donate their biological and genetic information to
institutions that they believe, have good will towards them,
institutions that will take into account their situation and
needs before they decide how to act. Namely, they can
choose to participate and collaborate only with researchers
and research institutions that they deem to be trustworthy.
Implications for biomedical research:
the importance of professional integrity
So far, this paper has drawn a distinction between trust and
reliance and have argued that both types of relationship,
that of reliance and of trust, are appropriate and relevant for
biomedical research. Also, it has discussed ways that can
promote reliance. These include the introduction of rules
and regulations, contracts and clear systems of account-
ability. Ways to promote trust, however, can be more dif-
ficult to identify. Reliance is a calculable relationship that
depends on a rational and mutual enforceable agreement
that serves the interests of both parties. Trust is an emotive
relationship of dependency7 associated with risk and vul-
nerability. Trust cannot be enforced and it greatly depends
on the character of both the trustor and the trustee.
It is possible for researchers and research institutions to
develop a character that can promote trust relationships by
showing their good will towards individuals and the public
as a whole. When we talk about character within a profes-
sion, we mainly refer to professional integrity. Professional
integrity is linked with the identity to which professionals
subscribe (Miller et al. 1998). Virtues such as courage,
respectfulness, responsibility, humility and prudence can be
associated with the character of the good biomedical
researcher (Macfarlane 2010). These professional charac-
teristics or virtues cannot be prescribed nor can be they
enforced by rules and regulations, but develop through a
process of education and habituation. Rules and regulations
are important in setting the scene of biomedical research,
but ‘more should be expected from scientists when it comes
to responsible conduct of research’ than just conforming to
rules and regulations (Institute of Medicine 2002). By
appealing to the conscience of individual scientists, the
scientific community as a whole should seek to evoke the
highest possible standard of research behaviour’ (Institute
of Medicine 2002). Appropriately designed educational
5 It should be made clear that an attitude of good will towards
participants does not require researchers to always act at the
participants’ best interests. Indeed, often researchers would invite
volunteers to participate in risky research that could potentially put
their health and even life into danger (e.g. first-in-human clinical
trials). It does, however, mean that researchers would consider the
participants’ vulnerability and their counting on them as a substantive
reason for minimising risk and introducing appropriate steps and
procedures avoid harming participants; rather than, for example,
considering consent as the sole justification for all kinds and types of
risk. (I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this point).
6 Of course, not all biomedical research is equally risky, nor all
research participants expect direct and individual benefits from
participating. A great majority of research participants decide to
become research subjects not for their own good but for the good of
others and of society in general. They are primarily motivated by
altruism rather than personal gain, and they expect that researchers
and research institutions share the same motivations, namely that they
are guided by a desire to serve the social good rather than a selfish
motivation of personal gain. This is the reason why people are more
inclined to participate in research conducted by researchers and
institution they perceive have more of a social character, e.g.
universities, rather than private institutions e.g. pharmaceutical
companies. See: Pullman et al. (2012). 7 This is not to say that it is not rational.
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programs that raise awareness on the ethical issues of
biomedical research, and promote ethical sensitivity and
ethical reasoning have been suggested as a way to promote
professional integrity (Miller et al. 1998; Johnsson et al.
2014).
The notion of professional integrity does not only apply
to individuals but also to institutions. Institutions are not
just the amalgamation of the individuals that constitute
them, but they also form a distinct entity that can express
its own moral character thought its collective actions.
Characteristics or virtues such as fairness, openness,
transparency, consistency, and also dedication to ethics and
ethical research can be seen as indications of an institu-
tions’ moral character and promote trustworthiness (Baier
2004). ‘For institutions, it is a matter of creating an envi-
ronment that promotes responsible conduct by embracing
standards of excellence, trustworthiness, and lawfulness
that inform institutional practices.’(2002) Particularly,
demonstrating great interest in promoting ethical research,
for example by incorporating a dedicated ethics team into
their system, could play an important role in promoting
professional integrity and consequently, public trust. By
giving appropriate attention to the ethical component of
research and by dedicating resources for the investigation
and analysis of ethical issues, it would communicate to the
potential partners and participants that ethics is not just a
formality but a core component of their professional
character (Kerasidou and Parker 2014). But most impor-
tantly, institutions should openly and demonstrably support
and uphold their social role. The social role of biomedical
research is the generation of new knowledge and the dis-
covery of effective therapeutics with the ultimate aim to
improve the health and welfare of all people. Research
institutions should commit themselves to fulfilling this aim.
An institution’s actions, past and present, their track record
in achieving their social mission and their other relations
and affiliations will be the indicators of its moral character.
Participants and collaborators would be able to place their
trust to such an institution, as they will have good reasons
to believe that it will honour their vulnerability and will
assume a position of good will towards them.
Conclusion
Establishing a regulatory framework that governs and
regulates biomedical research has increased its reliability
but has had very little effect in making it more trustworthy.
To the contrary, it has been argued that promoting relia-
bility can have an adverse effect on trust. Yet, a trustor-
trustee relationship is important and relevant in biomedical
research as vulnerability and belief in the trustee’s good
will form the basis of that relationship. If researchers and
research institutions want to restore trust in biomedical
research, they should focus not only on promoting their
reliability through regulatory and compliance systems, but
also on promoting their trustworthiness. This can be
achieved by fostering and encouraging ethical conduct and
ethical research through educational programs, dedicated
ethics teams and most importantly engagement with
stakeholders to help promote the social value of research.
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